mass transportation assistance came at the expense of serving the core mass transportation clientele.
Dynamic Universalism
The federal aid allocation literature suggests that universalism may be achieved through two processes. The first process begins when single programs are authorized, usually addressing needs that are not geographically dispersed; the supporting majorities for these programs are small, spending is modest, and the program benefits few congressional districts. The legislation authorizing new programs, however, is often little more than a blank page. Agency personnel who administer new programs can interpret eligibility liberally (Anton 1989; Rich 1989 ) and set decision rules for processing grant applications strategically. Over time, the geographical allocation of assistance expands, and so does legislative support for the program.2 Still, the geographical distribution of a problem or need inevitably limits the amount of support which may be generated from broadening a program, however loosely Congress has defined its purpose.
In a second process, which Stein and Bickers (1991) call bundling, the agency's enabling legislation puts together a package of programs that meets the needs of a diverse clientele. When Congress reauthorizes existing legislation, agency managers and program clientele work to refocus existing programs and to enact entirely new programs. This process broadens the agency's constituency and creates a portfolio of programs addressing a variety of similar yet distinct needs. Successful packages assist both the original core clientele and newer peripheral constituencies.
In sum, Congress is likely at first to enact programs that are small and that benefit few congressional districts. If outside demands for program assistance can be generated and met, small-sized, minimum-winning coalitions that were put together to support the initial program may eventually develop into oversized or even universalistic coalitions as program benefits in some form become widely available to all types of jurisdictions. The inherent geographical limitation of most needs has an important effect. Groups of related programs, rather than single programs, can distribute assistance broadly enough to sustain universal legislative coalitions. In the next section, we analyze the formulation and allocation of mass transportation policy from 1964 through 1986, as a test of the dynamic universal model.
The Origins and Evolution of Federal Mass Transportation Programs
From modest origins, federal mass transportation assistance evolved into a collection of programs that benefitted over 400 congressional districts annually by the 1980s. The discretionary capital program and the formula operating assistance program provided most of the almost $4 billion allocated (see Figure 1) . Congress also funded programs for technical assistance, research, development, demonstration projects, training activities, planning, and technical studies and for elderly, handicapped, and rural constituencies, but at significantly lower levels (Urban Mass Transit Administration 1983). A wellexecuted allocation strategy and the enactment of additional assistance programs enlarged the support and distribution of mass transportation assistance to universal proportions.
Program Broadening
Transit interests had considerable difficulty getting federal involvement. The first program, passed in 1964, reflected mass transit's limited geographical appeal (Danielson 1965) . The margin of voting support for the 1964 act in both houses was small: 52 to 41 in the Senate and 214 to 190 in the House (Hansen 1969) . Program authorizations were modest. The bill authorized only $75 million for the first fiscal year and $150 million for the following two (Smerk 1974) . Barely a hundred districts received mass transportation assistance over these years.
This article argues that program administrators play an important role in universalizing federal discretionary assistance programs. I expect to find that bureaucratic agents actively sought to expand the scope of mass transportation assistance. Indeed, agency officials accomplished much of the early expansion by strategically allocating capital grants to increase the geographical scope of mass transit assistance.
It is clear that the agency officials intended to build a large congressional constituency. The Secretary of Transportation, John Volpe, commented before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee in 1969, "I think that the program thus far has succeeded remarkably well in preserving transportation systems in smaller cities that would otherwise have been lost. It generally is not understood that the largest number of grants has been made to smaller cities.... We have made grants to 84 cities of less than 250,000 and we have made grants The new formula program that Congress enacted in 1974 distributed assistance based on population and population density, changes that had particular consequences for the evolution of mass transportation assistance. On a per rider basis, the formula favored transit riders in smaller cities. The new formula program also provided recipients the choice of receiving operating or capital assistance. Peripheral constituents were less able than their big city counterparts to absorb massive infusions of capital (Jones 1985) . Once local public agencies bought out small private operators or replaced the buses of small city lines, their need for capital assistance diminished. However, these systems had a continuing need for operation subsidies. These subsidies and the new formula met the needs of middle-sized cities and The short-term impact of the formula program is dramatic: the regression coefficient shows that an additional 130 districts benefitted after the formula program was enacted. While the rate of increase levels off markedly afterwards, the number of congressional districts assisted each year continues to increase, and this substantial impact is sustained over the remainder of the period analyzed. The combined value of the trend and postenactment trend variables is 6.28; before enactment of the formula program, their combined value was 21.
Through 1986, transit expenditures kept pace with the increasing geographical scope of transit programs. The correlations between the number of congressional districts benefitted and the level of program obligations is .94 and statistically significant at the .01 level. By the 1980s, the discretionary capital and formula assistance programs together attained universalistic proportions benefitting upwards of 400 congressional districts annually (see Figure 3) .5
Universalism and the Allocation of Federal Mass Transportation Assistance
Seeking both to build legislative support and to effectively subsidize the most deserving recipients presents program administrators with a conundrum. They may become less able to assist recipients who are most in need as they spread resources geographically to develop a larger constituency.6 If this tradeoff does characterize the process of universalization, we would expect to see the share of total assistance received by the core constituency decline as appropriations and the geographical coverage of mass transportation assistance increase.
The analysis above has shown that UMTA officials initially adopted an allocation strategy-the discretionary capital pro- gram-to meet the needs of a broad constituency. However, after 1974, UMTA redirected the discretionary capital assistance to meet the needs of the core clientele, funding major modernization and system extensions in New York City, Boston, Baltimore, and Chicago. The agency also provided grants to build entirely new rapid rail transit facilities in Atlanta and Miami. The average per capita benefits of discretionary assistance (reported in Table 3 ) shows this heavy investment in the rail systems of core constituents rather than in bus systems in the 1970s and early 1980s. Clearly, core districts served by transit systems incorporating rail technologies (the original advocates for federal assistance) received the lion's share of discretionary capital assistance in per capita terms.
This concentration on core constituents followed the earlier strategy of directing discretionary assistance to peripheral constituen- cies. UMTA appears to have avoided making the tradeoff between targeting and support building as they made large amounts available to core constituents after 1974. This finding implies that the ineffective targeting often theorized to result from building universal coalitions may not be as severe as is commonly assumed. However, our analysis also shows that the UMTA could target core constituencies in part because the formula program provided operating and capital assistance for the more routine needs of peripheral constituencies. Over the years, Congress, UMTA, and transit interests worked to maintain a political balance among different mass transit constituencies by changing distribution formulas and redefining program purposes. The painstaking consideration they gave to the programs' differing clienteles is evident in testimony provided by top transportation officials on proposed legislation over the years. Differences in the transit systems of the core and peripheral constituencies helped UMTA to broaden support in Congress on the one hand and to direct increasing amounts of capital funds to core constituents on the other. In mass transportation, peripheral support was relatively cheap, since bus technology cost considerably less than rail technology. This distinction holds in some other federal assistance programs; for example, federal programs for helping local governments comply with federal wastewater standards must support more expensive technologies in large cities than in small ones. However, there are federal programs in which the per capita cost of assisting additional recipients is fairly constant. For instance, providing primary health care to a larger population generally requires only that more doctors, nurses, and clinics be put in place to serve larger constituencies. Here the technologies are the same for all recipients and the cost of building peripheral support correspondingly higher.
The evolution and refocusing of mass transportation assistance which took place over the years are evident in Table 1 . Some changes helped make transit assistance more attractive and applicable to a broader constituency. For instance, legislation in 1973 raised the federal matching share for capital assistance from 75% to 80% of the cost of the project. Later changes refocused and narrowed the geographical scope of certain programs to suit the changing needs of different constituencies. In 1982, new legislation earmarked one cent of the newly raised gasoline tax for funding the original capital program, whose purpose was narrowed to fund nonroutine modernization, extensions, and construction of rail transit systems, as well as bus needs not met by the formula program established in 1982.
So each major federal mass transportation assistance program tended to benefit different constituencies over the time examined here. The discretionary capital program funded major modernization and new construction projects in the original core constituencies and was eventually designated exclusively for that purpose in 1982. The formula program provided operating assistance to peripheral constituencies, which they needed far more than capital assistance once their immediate capital needs had been met. Figure 4 shows the extent to which these two assistance programs benefitted different constituencies. From 1974 to 1982, the for- mula program assisted 100 to 150 districts that did not receive discretionary capital assistance, boosting to almost 400 the total number of districts receiving transit assistance annually. However, the clienteles of the different programs were not entirely exclusive; many districts benefitted from both programs. An examination of the number of districts benefitted by both the discretionary capital and formula programs shows how legislation evolved and refocused the mix of programs. As a result of changes made in the discretionary capital and formula assistance programs in 1982, more districts benefitted from the formula program than from the discretionary capital program by 1984.
Conclusion
The origins and evolution of federal assistance programs are of theoretical interest because they verify how universalistic coalition building occurs over collections of programs and over successive program authorizations. The impetus and management of program expansion comes from administrative managers as well as from conscious agreement, tacit reciprocity, or consent among legislators. The findings presented here lend empirical support to formal models of legislative coalition building, such as Shepsle and Weingast's (1981), which predict that the geographical scope of federal assistance and legislative support will expand over time. They also reaffirm that universalism is an important condition for sustaining expensive assistance programs. However, to the extent that formal models conceptualize the process statically or limit themselves to decisions of support for single programs, they fail to model universalization as it actually takes place in Congress and the broader subgovernment environment.
Finally, the analysis demonstrates the importance of evaluating federal assistance as bundles or administrative packages. If only the discretionary capital program had been studied, the analysis would have incorrectly assessed the tradeoffs commonly attributed to universalism. Instead, this article views targeting within the context of all transit assistance programs, particularly the major formula programs for capital and operating assistance. We found that different mass transportation constituencies are segregated to a considerable extent into different programs (the big city rail systems into the capital program, the middle-sized bus systems into the formula program, rural areas into the rural assistance program). Program administrators and coalition leaders administer a portfolio of programs, each best suited to the needs of a different constituency. Mass transportation assistance is distributed universally only if we consider these programs collectively. 
